Continuous-variable source-device-independent quantum key distribution
  against general attacks by Zhang, Yi-Chen et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
11
97
3v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
29
 N
ov
 20
18
Continuous-variable source-device-independent quantum key distribution
against general attacks
Yichen Zhang1, Ziyang Chen2, Christian Weedbrook3, Song Yu1, and Hong Guo2∗
1 State Key Laboratory of Information Photonics and Optical Communications,
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
2 State Key Laboratory of Advanced Optical Communication Systems and Networks,
School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science,
and Center for Quantum Information Technology, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China and
3Xanadu, 372 Richmond St W, Toronto, M5V 2L7, Canada
(Dated: November 30, 2018)
The continuous-variable quantum key distribution with entanglement in the middle, a semi-device-
independent protocol, places the source in the untrusted third party between Alice and Bob, and
thus has the advantage of high levels of security with the purpose of eliminating the assumptions
about the source device. However, previous works considered the collective-attack analysis, which
inevitably assumes that the states of the source has an identical and independently distributed (i.i.d)
structure, and limits the application of the protocol. To solve this problem, we modify the original
protocol by exploiting an energy test to monitor the potential high energy attacks an adversary may
use. Our analysis removes the assumptions of the light source and the modified protocol can therefore
be called source-device-independent protocol. Moreover, we analyze the security of the continuous-
variable source-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol with a homodyne-homodyne
structure against general coherent attacks by adapting a state-independent entropic uncertainty
relation. The simulation results indicate that, in the universal composable security framework, the
protocol can still achieve high key rates against coherent attacks under the condition of achievable
block lengths.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2], as one of the
most practical quantum cryptography technology, allows
two users (traditionally called Alice and Bob) to establish
a set of secret keys exploiting both quantum mechanics
and classical post-processing methods. This can provide
information-theoretic security even against existing po-
tential eavesdroppers.
Continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocol [3, 4], of
which the characteristic is that the information is en-
coded on the quadratures of the light field and mea-
sured with coherent measurement methods, e.g., homo-
dyne [5] and heterodyne detection [6], has developed
rapidly. There are two main reasons resulting in CV-
QKD attracting so much attention in recent years: it
can be easily implemented with standard telecom com-
ponents and compatible with wavelength division mul-
tiplexing [7, 8], and it can achieve high key rate in
metropolitan distance [9], which has advantages of short-
range implementation.
There are plenty of CV-QKD protocols proposed to
deal with different scenarios. In the case of fully trusted-
device protocols, it is always assumed that both Alice and
Bob are honest, and Eve can only control the quantum
channels rather than the devices at the two parties. A
large number of distinctive trusted-device protocols, in-
cluding discrete modulation CV-QKD protocols [10–12],
two-way protocols [13–18] and so forth, have been put
∗ hongguo@pku.edu.cn
forward to enrich the protocol design. However, because
of the imperfection of the practical source and detection
devices, a QKD system may be attacked by an potential
eavesdropper, and it compromise the security of a proto-
col [19]. To eliminate all the loopholes of devices, fully
device-independent protocols are proposed, which do not
make any assumptions for all experimental devices and
allows Eve to control them all . Nevertheless, those pro-
tocols face experimental challenges because they have to
perform a detection-loophole-free Bell test [20].
As a compromise, semi-device-independent (semi-
DI) protocols are proposed, such as measurement-
device-independent (MDI) [21–23] and one-sided device-
independent (1sDI) [24, 25] QKD protocols, to give a
trade off between the security of some devices and the
performance of a protocol, which regard that part of
the protocol is honest and the other part is untrusted.
Remarkably, both CV-MDI [26–28] and CV-1sDI proto-
cols [24, 29, 30] have been analyzed against general co-
herent attacks, which improves the security analysis of
the protocols.
CV-QKD with entanglement in the middle [31] is the
protocol of which the source is placed with the untrusted
third party in the middle and controlled by the malicious
eavesdropper. Alice and Bob then measure one of the
modes they received separately, with either homodyne or
heterodyne detection. The goal of the protocol is that
we do not need to give assumptions on the source, which
is sometimes ill-characterised and unsafe in communica-
tion. Nevertheless, the security analysis of the CV-QKD
with entanglement in the middle protocol is only confined
to the collective attack cases, which inevitably assumes
2that the states of the source has identical and indepen-
dently distributed (i.i.d) structure, i.e., ρAnBn = σ
⊗n
AB,
leading to the protocol not being able to reach the origi-
nal idea of source-device-independent (SDI).
Inspired by the security analysis technique used in the
1sDI protocol by F. Furrer et al. [29, 30], we adapt one
type of state-independent entropic uncertainty relation
with CVs to analyse the security of the CV-QKD with
entanglement in the middle protocol under coherent at-
tacks and only consider the case that both Alice and Bob
perform homodyne detections. We modify the original
protocol by exploiting an energy test at the reconcilia-
tion side (Bob’s side for reverse reconciliation as an ex-
ample) to monitor the potential high energy attacks an
adversary may use. By properly quantifying the corre-
lation between Alice’s and Bob’s data, which could be
used for estimating Eve’s knowledge of the raw key, we
obtain the secret key rate of a finite number of exchanged
signals supposing that the strategy Eve exploiting is a co-
herent attack. Our analysis removes the assumptions of
the light source and assumes that the sampling process
performed in Alice’s and Bob’s sides are i.i.d, which is
needed for exploiting the entropic uncertainty relation.
Therefore, The modified protocol can be called CV-SDI
QKD protocol. Finally, simulation shows that even when
the coherent attack is considered, CV-QKD with entan-
glement in the middle can still reach a non-zero key rate
over short distance, without giving any constrains of the
source.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we give
a short description on the definition of composable se-
curity in QKD. In Sec. III, we give an introduction of
the original CV-QKD protocol with entanglement in the
middle under collective attacks. In Sec. IV, we exploit
a version of state-independent entropic uncertainty rela-
tion to analyse the security of the modified CV-SDI QKD
protocol against coherent attacks. Then, in Sec. V, we
present the simulation results of the secret key rates in
both the collective and coherent attack cases. Finally, we
summarize the paper in Sec. VI.
II. COMPOSABLE SECURITY DEFINITION
A detailed discussion of the composability in quantum
cryptography can be seen in Ref. [32]. For better under-
standing of the security criteria in QKD, we first need to
know what is perfectly secure for a QKD protocol. A per-
fectly secure QKD protocol should satisfy three criteria:
correctness, secrecy and robustness [32].
We denote SA is the key in Alice’s side and SB is the
key in Bob’s side. Correctness requires that every key
outputted from Alice and Bob’s side is identical, namely
SA = SB = S. Secrecy means that the output key S is
uniformly distributed and independent of Eve’s auxiliary
systems, and the classical-quantum (cq) state of S and E
can be described as ρsE=
∑
s∈S
ps |s〉 〈s| ⊗ ρsE , where ps is
the probability that the key satisfies S = s and {|s〉}s∈S
is a family of orthonormal vectors. Here the uniform dis-
tribution ensures that the eavesdropper is all equal prob-
ability for guessing any result, and there is no optimal
guessing strategies. Being independent of Eve means Eve
cannot increase the guessing probability with the help of
its auxiliary systems. Robustness means that the pro-
tocol can usually generate a key, i.e., S 6= ⊥. Hence if
a protocol both satisfies correctness, secrecy and robust-
ness, then the protocol achieves perfect security, and we
can describe the perfectly secure classical-quantum-state
of S and E as
ρperfectSE = (1− p⊥)
∑
s∈S
1
|S| |s〉 〈s| ⊗ ρ
′
E+p⊥ |⊥〉 〈⊥|⊗ρ′′E,
(1)
where p⊥ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the protocol
cannot generate a key and ρ′E and ρ
′′
E are the density
operators of Eve.
However, a practical QKD protocol cannot be designed
perfectly, so the perfect security definition is hard to ful-
fill. If a protocol is “similar” to a perfectly secure proto-
col, we can define the ǫ-security by indistinguishability to
describe a protocol of which security is approximately the
same as the ideal protocol. The requirement of ǫ-security
is that a protocol should be ǫc-correct, ǫs-secrecy and ǫr-
robust [32].
ǫc-correctness requires that the output keys SA and SB
from Alice and Bob’s side should be the same at most
times expect for a very small probability ǫc, which could
be described by
Pr [SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫc. (2)
The requirement of ǫr-robustness is that the probability
of a protocol which cannot generate keys is not larger
than a very small value ǫr, which means
Pr [SA = ⊥] ≤ ǫr, (3)
and a protocol is ǫs-secret if and only if the distance
between the classical-quantum-state ρSE and ρ
perfect
SE is
smaller than ǫs, which could be represented by
1
2
∥∥∥ρSE − ρperfectSE ∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫs, (4)
where ρSE is the joint state of a output key S and the
auxiliary system held by Eve.
If a protocol satisfies both ǫc-correct, ǫs-secrecy and
ǫr-robust, then we can treat the protocol ǫ-secure, where
ǫ = ǫc + ǫs + ǫr.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic of the entanglement-in-the-
middle CV-QKD protocol [31]. EPR: untrusted two-mode
squeezed state with variance V . Hom: homodyne detection.
QM: quantum memory. Only the homodye detections are dis-
cussed here and Eve’s attacks are considered as two correlated
modes attacks without loss of generality.
III. THE ORIGINAL CV-QKD PROTOCOL
WITH ENTANGLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE
AGAINST COLLECTIVE ATTACKS
We begin by describing the CV-QKD protocol with
entanglement in the middle, which was originally pro-
posed in Ref. [31]. A two-mode squeezed vacuum state
EPR, with an unknown variance V , is prepared by the
untrusted third party, see Fig. 1. The EPR source can be
created either by a untrusted communication party Char-
lie or by the potential adversary Eve. The two modes of
an EPR source, e.g., EPR1 and EPR2, are sent to Al-
ice and Bob separately though quantum channels. As
the general assumption in QKD is that both of the two
quantum channels could be totally controlled by poten-
tial eavesdropper Eve; leading to the introduction of loss
and noise to the states after transmission. Assuming the
quadratures of the two modes of the EPR source are
XˆEPR1 and XˆEPR2 with the covariance matrix (CM)
γEPR=
(
V I
√
V 2 − 1Z√
V 2 − 1Z V I
)
, (5)
where I = diag[1, 1] and Z = diag[1,−1], and the trans-
missivities of two channels are τA and τB respectively,
then we have the quadratures after transmissions, given
by
XˆA=
√
τAXˆEPR1+
√
1−τAXˆE1 ,
XˆB=
√
τBXˆEPR2+
√
1−τBXˆE2 , (6)
where E1 and E2 are the ancillary systems which Eve
inject into the links to attack the protocol. The two-
correlated-modes eavesdropping strategy is considered
here, which is the general two-modes attack strategy,
where the CM γE1E2 of the two correlated modes is
γE1E2 =
(
ωAI G
G ωBI
)
, (7)
where ωA and ωB are the variance of modes E1 and E2,
and the correlation termG = diag [g, g′] with the correla-
tion parameters g and g′ satisfying the constraints shown
in Ref. [33]. The attack is optimal by setting modes E1
and E2 as coherent given in Refs. [23, 34, 35].
Originally, Alice and Bob perform quadrature mea-
surements via homodyne or heterodyne detections, and
in this paper, we only consider the scenario that both
Alice and Bob employ homodyne detections to get one
measurement result, i.e., quadrature x or p. After finish-
ing the state preparation and measurement phases, both
Alice and Bob announce which quadrature they choose
through an authenticated pubic channel to sift their keys.
They hold the data for which the selected quadratures
are the same and discard the rest. Finally, the two
communication parties proceed with classical data post-
processing, namely parameter estimation, error correc-
tion and privacy amplification to distill their keys.
In the case of collective attacks setting, the state
ρANBNEN after all runs can be considered as a tensor
product state, namely ρANBNEN = ρ
⊗N
ABE , where N is the
total number of quantum signals exchanged during the
protocol. In this paper, we only focus on the asymptotic
case under collective attacks to show the ideal perfor-
mance of the protocol, where the total number of quan-
tum states N tends to infinite. The asymptotic secret
key rate Kasymcollective (for reverse reconciliation) is given by
the Devetak-Winter formula [36], which reads
Kasymcollective = max {βI (A : B)− χ (B : E) , 0} , (8)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I (A : B) is the
classical mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s
data, and χ (B : E) is the Holevo information between
Bob’s data and the eavesdropper [37]. This is given by
χ (B : E) = S (E) − S (E|B), where S (E) is the von
Neumann entropy of Eve and S (E|B) is the conditional
von Neumann entropy of Eve given Bob’s information.
χ (B : E) can be bounded with the help of the Gaus-
sian state extramelity theorem [38, 39] in the case of col-
lective attacks, hence we assume that the state ρAB is
Gaussian to minimize the final secret key rates, which
can be calculated from the CM. A detailed derivation of
the CM and the key rate can be seen in Appendix A.
IV. THE MODIFIED CV-SDI QKD PROTOCOL
AGAINST GENERAL COHERENT ATTACKS
In the case of general coherent attacks, the assumption
that ρANBNEN has tensor product structure is invalid, so
we cannot apply Eq. (8) directly to bound the security
key rate after finite runs of the protocol. There are in
general two main security-proof techniques developed in
CV-QKD to handle coherent attack issues. One method
is the de Finetti theorem [40, 41], which have the ability
to reduce the security from coherent attacks to collective
attacks, and it was successfully employed to analyse the
4protocol which has some symmetric properties [27]. The
alternative is the entropic uncertainty relation [29, 30],
which requires that the protocol needs to randomly mea-
sure between two quadratures and perform the sifting
process [24, 28]. We exploit the latter tool in this paper
to obtain the security of the entanglement-in-the-middle
protocol with homodyne-homodyne structure against co-
herent attacks.
We analyse the protocol under general coherent attacks
with untrusted source in the middle by adapting the ap-
proach described in Ref. [30]. Thanks to the composable
security framework, we have the ability to study the pro-
tocol considering some imperfect situation, such as the
practical detection model, the energy test and finite-size
effect, which allows us to modify the protocol in coherent-
attack case.
A. The practical detection model and the
measurement phase
We model the practical detector as an ideal homo-
dyne detector followed by an analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) with finite sampling range, and therefore the mea-
surement process can be divided into two steps.
In Step 1, Alice and Bob exploit ideal homodyne de-
tectors to measure the input signal with infinite ranges
and resolutions. The measurement quadratures are ideal
continuous variables with infinite dimensions, hence the
measurement results are also continuous. Assuming that
the sifting process is done, we denote the outputs of ideal
homodyne detectors as QA and QB in two sides. In gen-
eral CV-QKD scenario, the statistical distribution of each
outcome should follow a Gaussian distribution.
In order to obtain a tight bound using the entropic un-
certainty relation, we need to rescale one of two results,
QA or QB, and ensure that Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ment outcomes have high correlations after transmission
through untrusted channels. We use the transformations
below (using Alice as an example) to scale the quadrature
measurements:
QA → Q˜A = tqQA, (9)
where tq denotes the rescaling factor related to the chan-
nel losses of Alice and Bob, which can be determined by
matching the variances of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
results. Supposing thatm signals are randomly chosen to
do the parameter estimation, the average value of quadra-
ture measurement results both in Alice’s and Bob’s sides
can be estimated by
Eˆ (QA) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
QiA, Eˆ (QB) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
QiB, (10)
where QA =
{
QiA
}m
i=1
and QB =
{
QiB
}m
i=1
, and it is easy
to estimate the parameter tq by [28]
tˆq =
√√√√√√√
m∑
i=1
(
QiB − Eˆ (QB)
)2
m∑
i=1
(
QiA − Eˆ (QA)
)2 . (11)
In the symmetric case, where the channel losses and
noises of Alice and Bob are approximately the same, we
can simplify the analysis by assuming that tq ≈ 1.
In Step 2, the ADCs with finite range and finite pre-
cision followed by homodyne detectors are exploited to
discretize continuous measuring intervals into discrete in-
tervals, and the continuous variables Q˜A and QB are also
discretized. The measurement results are grouped into
intervals:
(−∞,−α] , (−α,−α+ δ] , ...., (α− δ, α] , (α,∞) , (12)
where α is the maximum discretization range of the
ADCs, which takes the finite range of detectors into con-
sideration, and δ denotes the resolution of the measure-
ment, which shows how much detail the detector can de-
tect. The corresponding outcome alphabet is denoted
by χ = {1, 2, ..., 2α/δ}, where we assume 2α/δ ∈ N and
every measurement outcome corresponds to one of the
intervals. After this step, the continuous outcomes are
replaced by the discrete results, which are denoted by
Q˜A
discrete→ XA, QB discrete→ XB. (13)
This detection model can effectively illustrate the prac-
tical detector with finite range and resolution, without
considering the efficiency of the detector, which could
be modeled by a beam splitter with transmissivity Td
[42]. However, the “discretization” process may cause
security issues when compared with the ideal detection
case since the detection results are missing information
about the quadratures. One issue is that any measure-
ment outcomes inside one of the equal-length intervals
(−α,−α+ δ] , ...., (α− δ, α] will map to the same value
and it may cause a reduction in the information about
the state within each sampling interval due to the finite
sampling bits. This effect can be suppressed by increas-
ing the number of sampling bits. The other problem
is caused by two intervals with infinite length, namely
(−∞,−α] and [α,∞), and users cannot know the full in-
formation about the state outside the detection range. In
other word, users cannot distinguish whether the energy
of the measured pulse is low or high, which may leave
some loopholes for eavesdropping. This problem can be
solved by the energy test solution.
B. The energy test
For fear of the large energy attack that Eve may exploit
during the communication process, the protocol should
5۰ܗ܊
ࢀ ۶ܗܕ܆۰ᇱ܆۰ ࢈
܆
۾ࢇᇱ
ࢇ
࢚૚࢚૛ ૚૛
FIG. 2. (Color online) Schematic of the energy test at Bob’s
side. Bob uses a beam splitter with transmissivity T to split
the incoming signal into two parts. The transmission mode
X′B is used for generating Bob’s data and the reflection mode
a′ is exploited to perform the energy test. a and b are two
vacuum modes induced by beam splitters. Modes t1 and t2
are the output modes of the balanced beam splitter used for
checking whether |qt1 | and |pt2 | are below a certain threshold.
be modified by adding the energy test step to ensure
that the energy of measured states is below a certain
threshold. We adapt the energy test method proposed
in Ref. [30] to study entanglement-in-the-middle proto-
col to remove the assumption of the source in the se-
curity analysis, which should be considered in trusted
source scenario [29], hence this protocol also can be called
source-device-independent protocol.
Assuming that the protocol is performed with reverse
reconciliation, the energy test is exploited in Bob’s side
before Bob perform the measurement step, which is de-
scribed in Fig. 2. Bob use a beam splitter with almost
perfect transmissivity T to split incoming mode XB into
two parts, and a is the vacuum mode introduced by the
other port of the beam splitter. Mode X′B is the trans-
mitted mode of the output used for generating Bob’s
raw data using a homodyne detector, and a′ is the re-
flected mode for the energy test. The reflected mode a′
is measured by a heterodyne detector, which consists of
a balanced beam splitter and two homodyne detectors.
Modes t1 and t2 are the output modes of the balanced
beam splitter used for checking whether the amplitude
of one output |qt1 | and the phase of the other output
|pt2 | are below a certain threshold. If for every measured
signal, both the amplitude |qt1 | and the phase |pt2 | are
not larger than the threshold Mth, we say that the en-
ergy test passes; and the protocol aborts otherwise. The
probability that Bob measures with homodyne detection
larger than the detection range α can be bounded by the
function Γ (α, T,Mth), which reads [30]
Γ(α, T,Mth) :=
√
1+λ+
√
1+λ−1
2
exp
(
− (µα−Mth)
2
T (1+λ) /2
)
,
(14)
where µ =
√
1−T
2T and λ =
(
2T−1
T
)2
. The smoothness of
the energy test ǫ˜ further can be bounded by
ǫ˜ =
√
2nΓ (α, T,Mth)
ppass
. (15)
C. Finite-size effect and the key rate
In the coherent-attack scenario, due to the leftover
hash lemma, the ǫc-correct and ǫs-secret key of length
ℓsec can be extracted [43], which can be expressed by
ℓsec ≤ Hǫmin
(
XkeyB |E
)
ρ
− ℓEC − log2
1
ǫ21ǫc
+ 2, (16)
where ℓEC denotes the leaked information in error cor-
rection step, and it can be estimated before the error
correction begin during the parameter estimation phase,
Hǫmin
(
XkeyB |E
)
is the smooth conditional min-entropy
of data XkeyB with smoothing parameter ǫ, conditioned
on the information Eve may have, which quantifies Eve’s
uncertainty about the Alice’s measurement outcomes. ǫ
satisfies ǫ ≤ (ǫs − ǫ1)/2ppass − 2ǫ˜, where ǫ˜ is the security
parameter related to the energy test given in Eq. (15) and
we choose ǫ1 = ǫs/2 for simplification [44]. Equation (16)
is a CV type key formula considering the quantum side
information E in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space [29].
The parameter ℓEC can be easily obtained by pub-
lishing some of Bob’s data (in the reverse reconciliation
case), which is
ℓEC = H (XB)− βI (XB : XA) , (17)
where H (XB) denotes the discrete Shannon entropy of
the data in Bob side, which can be described by
H (XB) = −
n∑
i=1
p (xi) δlog2p (xi)− log2δ, (18)
and I (XB : XA) is the mutual information between Alice
and Bob.
Our target is to bound the smooth min-entropy
Hǫmin
(
XkeyB |E
)
in the presence of quantum adversaries.
The entropic uncertainty relations were originally intro-
duced in discrete variable QKD to bound the min-entropy
and to show the protocols’ security [45, 46]. They were
thereafter extended to infinite dimensions by Furrer et
al. [47, 48]. Therefore we exploit one type of uncer-
tainty relation formula shown in Ref. [30] to bound the
min-entropy in the entanglement-in-the-middle protocol,
and the feature of the entropic uncertainty relation to-
gether with the energy test, resulting in the protocols
being source-device-independent.
Entropic uncertainty relation gives a bound of guessing
the uncertainty that the eavesdropper may have, when
6both communication parties randomly measure in two
bases. The relationship between smooth min- and max-
entropies is given by
Hǫmin
(
XkeyB |E
)
ω
≥ n log 1
c (δ)
−Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |An
)
ω
,
(19)
where c (δ) quantifies the overlap of the two measure-
ments and is independent of the measured states, which
considers the detectors’ discretization process and has
the form:
c (δ) =
1
2π
δ2 · S(1)0
(
1,
δ2
4
)2
, (20)
where S
(1)
0 is the 0
th radial prolate spheroidal wave func-
tion of the first kind [49], which can be well approximated
by c (δ) ≈ δ2/(2π) if the interval length δ is not large.
Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |An
)
ω
is the smooth max-entropy between
Bob’s data and Alice’s system with smoothing parame-
ter ǫ. In Eq. (19), we assume that the random sampling
of detections are i.i.d. The goal of estimating the smooth
min-entropy Hǫmin
(
XkeyB |E
)
is to give an upper bound
of the smooth max-entropy Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |An
)
ω
.
To estimate the upper bound of Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |An
)
ω
,
first due to the data processing inequality [50], we can
obtain that
Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |An
)
ω
≤ Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |XkeyA
)
ω
, (21)
and we need to bound the correlation between data XkeyB
and XkeyA . For that we exploit the average distance,
d (X,Y ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Xi − Yi|, (22)
to give the bound of the smooth max-entropy. It has been
shown in Ref. [29] that if Pr
[
d
(
XkeyB , X
key
A
)
≥ d
]
≤ ǫ2
hold, we can always give a bound by
Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |XkeyA
)
≤ nlog2γ (d) . (23)
where γ is a function arising from a large deviation con-
sideration, which reads
γ (t) =
(
t+
√
t2 + 1
) [
t
/(√
t2 + 1− 1
)]t
. (24)
However, we have only data XpeA and X
pe
B with m length
to perform the parameter estimation rather than data
XkeyA and X
key
B , thus parameter d needs to be bounded
by exploiting the data only consumed in parameter esti-
mation step. Two functions need to be defined first, one
is the average second moment of the difference between
two sequences, which reads
d2 (X,Y ) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
∣∣Xk − Y k∣∣2, (25)
and the other is the average second moment for the dis-
cretized data measurements, which is denoted by
m2 (X) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
∣∣Xk − α/δ∣∣2. (26)
Then we check whether the average distance dPE =
d (XpeA , X
pe
B ) is not larger than a certain threshold d0.
They continue the protocol if dPE ≤ d0 and abort the
protocol otherwise. In the case of the protocol proceed-
ing, Alice and Bob calculate the average second moments
of their data respectively, which denote V PEXA = m2 (X
pe
A )
and V PEXB = m2 (X
pe
B ) according to Eq. (26), and they
also compute the average second moments between their
data by V PEd = d2 (X
pe
A , X
pe
B ) according to Eq. (25).
With the help of Serfling’s large deviation bound [51],
we can finally bound the max-entropy by
Hǫmax
(
XkeyB |XkeyA
)
≤ nlog2γ (d0 + µ) , (27)
where µ describes the statistical fluctuation deviating
from d
(
XkeyB , X
key
A
)
, which denotes
µ =
√
2log2ξ
−1
Nσ∗
m
√
n
+
4 (α/δ) log2ξ
−1
3
N
nm
, (28)
with
σ2∗ =
m
N
(
V PEd −
m
N
(
dPE
)2)
+
m
N
(
V PEXA + V
PE
XB
+ 2
ν
δ2
)
+ 2
m
N
√(
V PEXA +
ν
δ2
)(
V PEXB +
ν
δ2
)
, (29)
and
ξ =
(
ǫs − ǫ1 − 2
√
2nΓ (α, T,Mth)
)2
− 2 exp
(
−2(ν/α)2 nm
2
N (m+ 1)
)
. (30)
ν is the smallest real number making ξ positive. If there
exist ν such that ξ is positive and ǫ1−2
√
2Γ (α, T,Mth) <
ǫs is satisfied, the final secret key rate under coherent
attacks can be written as
Kcoherent = ℓLow/N, (31)
where ℓLow is the lower bound of the secure key length,
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Secret key rates of the CV-SDI QKD
protocol. The protocol is under symmetric configuration with
τA = τB =
√
T where T is the total transmissivity of the
channel. We consider the protocol with perfect reconciliation
efficiency β = 1 and ideal modulation variance V = 105. We
also set the excess noise as ξ = 0.001 in each channel and the
overall security parameter is smaller than 10−20. The gray
dot line is the PLOB bound [52] and the black solid line is
the key rate under collective attacks. The red solid line is
the key rate under coherent attacks with infinite exchanged
signals. The four dashed lines, from top to bottom, are the
secret key rates under coherent attacks, with the block lengths
from 1010 to 107.
which reads
ℓLow = n
[
log
1
c (δ)
− log γ (d0 + µ)
]
−ℓEC−log 1
ε21εc
+2.
(32)
Otherwise, we denote that the key rate Kcoherent = 0.
The detailed proof of this section can be seen in Ref. [30].
V. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
Using the results in the previous section, we can plot
the secret key rate as a function of the total transmission
distance focusing on the symmetric configuration where
we set τA = τB =
√
T and T is the transmissivity of
the channel. The simulations are under two-mode op-
timal attacks to show the performance of the protocol
and both collective and coherent attack scenarios are dis-
cussed shown in Fig. 3.
In order to facilitate the analysis of the perfor-
mance of the protocol, we simulate the key rate with
some ideal parameters. For instance, we assume that
the protocol has an ideal modulation variance V =
105 (which could replace an infinite modulation vari-
ance) and perfect reconciliation efficiency β = 1.
Also, to get the lower bound of the protocol, we
set g = min
{√
(ωA − 1) (ωB + 1),
√
(ωA + 1) (ωB − 1)
}
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Secret key rates as functions of block
size of the CV-SDI QKD protocol. The black solid line shows
the performance with the distance of 5km. The red dot-
dashed line and the blue dashed line are the key rates of the
protocol with distances of 10km and 14km, respectively. The
other parameters are as in Fig. 3
and ωA = ωB = 1+Tξ/(1− T ) with excess noise ξ in one
channel for two-mode optimal attacks. In the coherent
attack cases, we set the interval parameter α to 52 [29]
and the overall security parameter is smaller than 10−20.
Meanwhile, the parameterMth is set to 12 to ensure that
the energy test fails with probability smaller than 10−20.
In Fig. 3, the gray dot line shows the Pirandola-
Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [52], which
gives an upper bound of the secret key capacity of the
lossy channel. The black solid line is the asymptotic key
rate under collective attacks, and the longest transmis-
sion distance is over 18km, which is a little shorter than
that of the two-mode individual attacks case (where the
correlation parameter g = 0) [31]. The other five curves,
from top to bottom, describe the key rates under coher-
ent attacks. The red solid curve is obtained for N →∞,
and the other dashed lines describe the rate for N = 1010
to N = 107 with finite exchanged signals. In Fig. 4, we
also plot the secret key rate under coherent attacks as
a function of block size for different distances. The dis-
tances are 5km, 10km and 14km, respectively. We point
out that when the block size reduces, the secret key rate
decreases, and it is not achievable if the block size is be-
low 107.
We notice that there is a gap between the performance
of CV-QKD protocol with entanglement in the middle
under collective attacks and that under asymptotic co-
herent attacks cases. The reason is that the bound given
by the entropic uncertainty relation is not very tight es-
pecially in the high losses regime, which has been shown
in Ref. [30].
8VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have analyzed the security of
continuous-variable source-device-independent quantum
key distribution protocol against general coherent at-
tacks, where the source of the protocol is untrusted and
may be controlled by the malicious adversary. By ex-
ploiting the state-independent entropic uncertainty rela-
tion together with the energy test, our analysis has no
assumptions on the source, making the protocol source-
device-independent even under coherent attacks. The
simulation results indicate that, in the universal com-
posable security framework, the protocol is still secure,
achieving high key rates against coherent attacks under
the condition of achievable block lengths (N from 107 to
1010).
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Appendix A: Covariance matrix and the secret key
rate under collective attacks
The final bipartite quantum state ρAB of Alice and
Bob has the CM with the form
γAB =
(
aI cZ
cZ bI
)
, (A1)
where
a = τAV + (1− τA)ωA,
b = τBV + (1− τB)ωB,
c =
√
τAτB
√
V 2 − 1− g√1− τA
√
1− τB, (A2)
and we let
g = min
{√
(ωA − 1) (ωB + 1),
√
(ωA + 1) (ωB − 1)
}
(A3)
by setting modes E1 and E2 are coherent. Then the
secret key rate Kasymcollective can be calculated by Eq. (8) if
we restrict our discussion in reverse reconciliation cases.
The mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s data
can be described as
I (A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
a
a− c2/b
)
. (A4)
To obtain the von Neumann entropy S (E) and S (E|B),
we always assume that Eve can purify the whole sys-
tem in order to maximize her information, thus we have
S (E) = S (AB) and S (E|B) = S (A|B). SAB is a func-
tion of the symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 of γAB, which
reads
S (AB) = G [(λ1 − 1)/2] +G [(λ2 − 1)/2] , (A5)
where
G (x) = (x+ 1) log2 (x+ 1)− x log x, (A6)
and
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
∆±
√
∆2 − 4D2
]
, (A7)
where we use the notations that ∆ = a2 + b2 − 2c2 and
D = ab − c2. After Bob performs homodyne detection,
Alice’s CM conditioned on Bob’s measurement results
will transform to
γxbA = γA − ΣTC(XγBX)−1ΣC , (A8)
where γA = aI, γB = bI, ΣC = cZ and X = [1, 0; 0, 0].
S (A|B) = G [(λ3 − 1)/2] is a function of the symplec-
tic eigenvalue λ3 of the covariance matrix γ
xb
A with
λ3 =
√
a
(
a− c2/b). Therefore, the secret key rate un-
der collective attacks when the reverse reconciliation is
performed is
Kasymcollective = βI (A : B)− [S (AB)− S (A|B)] . (A9)
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